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Abstract—With the emergence of the Internet-of-Things (IoT),
there is a growing need for access control and data protection
on low-power, pervasive devices. Biometric-based authentication
is promising for IoT due to its convenient nature and lower
susceptibility to attacks. However, the costs associated with
biometric processing and template protection are nontrivial for
smart cards, key fobs, and so forth. In this paper, we discuss the
security, cost, and utility of biometric systems and develop two
major frameworks for improving them. First, we introduce a new
framework for implementing biometric systems based on physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) and hardware obfuscation that,
unlike traditional software approaches, does not require non-
volatile storage of a biometric template/key. Aside from reducing
the risk of compromising the biometric, the nature of obfuscation
also provides protection against access control circumvention via
malware and fault injection. The PUF provides non-invertibility
and non-linkability. Second, a major requirement of the proposed
PUF/obfuscation approach is that a reliable (robust) key be
generated from the users input biometric. We propose a noise-
aware biometric quantization framework capable of generating
unique, reliable keys with reduced enrollment time and denoising
costs. Finally, we conduct several case studies. In the first, the
proposed noise-aware approach is compared to our previous
approach for multiple biometric modalities, including popular
ones (fingerprint and iris) and emerging cardiovascular ones
(ECG and PPG). The results show that ECG provides the best
tradeoff between reliability, key length, entropy, and cost. In the
second and third case studies, we demonstrate how reliability,
denoising costs, and enrollment times can be simultaneously
improved by modeling subject intra-variations for ECG.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Hardware Obfuscation,
ECG, Biometric, PUF, Access Control, Resource-Constrained
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in semiconductors, computing, and networking as
well as the upcoming Internet of Things (IoT) have given rise
to a “connected world” where machine-to-machine, human-to-
machine, human-to-thing, etc. interactions are commonplace.
Although this is touted to increase convenience and efficiency
of everyday life (e.g., through smart devices, vehicles, homes,
buildings, cities, healthcare, and more), there is overwhelming
evidence that current systems are ill-prepared from a security
perspective. This is especially true for low-cost electronic
devices or“thing”. For instance, inexpensive hacks have been
successfully demonstrated on more than 75% of Bluetooth
low energy (BLE) smart locks in the market [15], [16].
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Similarly, IoT wearables and mobile devices have the potential
to dramatically lower healthcare costs through remote health
monitoring but come with risks of fraud - due to the lack of
physical presence at the time of collection, the identity of the
user that transmits the health information is indeterminate [17].
Many of the aforementioned problems are related to access
control, and can be at least partially alleviated by incorporat-
ing biometric authentication. However, doing so successfully
can be challenging for resource-constrained IoT devices and
applications.
Biometric authentication systems generally consist of five
major components: sensor, feature extraction, template stor-
age/database, matcher, and decision module [18]. The sensor
represents the interface between the user and the authentication
system, and its function is to scan the biometric trait of
the user. Feature extraction processes the scanned biometric
data to extract the information that is useful in distinguishing
between different users. The feature set extracted during an
enrollment phase is either stored in a remote database as
a template indexed by the user’s identity information (i.e.,
match-on server) or stored on a smart card (i.e., match-
on card/device systems). The matcher may be hardware or
software which compares the template with an input query.
Finally, the decision module provides a response to the query,
i.e., whether the users biometric matches the template or not.
Biometric system failures can be categorized into two
classes [18]: (1) intrinsic failures that occur due to intra-
user variation and/or lack of distinctiveness for a biometric
modality; and (2) failures from attackers who circumvent the
system. In the case of the former, processing and matching
capabilities of resource-constrained devices may limit decision
accuracy of the biometric authentication system. Since IoT
systems are supposed to be convenient, users will likely not
tolerate high false accept rates which prevent them from
accessing their devices and data. The latter (attacks) are
an even greater concern. First, many IoT devices may ex-
ist in unprotected or hostile environments which leaves the
aforementioned components exposed to non-invasive, semi-
invasive, and invasive physical attacks that bypass matching or
decision modules (e.g., turn a negative decision into a positive
one), alter a stored template, perform hill-climbing [19], etc.
If successful, an attacker gains illegitimate system access.
Second, protection/privacy of the template is an enormous
challenge. If the raw biometric template can ever be recovered,
it is forever compromised because biometrics are irrevocable.
Existing countermeasures for protecting the template are
limited. In the most common instantiation (match-on server),
the template exists on a centralized server in a raw, encrypted,
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2salted, or transformed form. The template or keys/parameters
protecting them are vulnerable to hackers who time and
again break through security (e.g., Equifax data breach [20] ,
OPM theft of 5.1 million fingerprints [21] , etc.). More often
than not, communication between devices and servers in IoT
applications is insecure (e.g., passwords transmitted in plain-
text [22]) due to time-to-market constraints or inexperience
in security implementations. In an alternative instantiation
(match-on card/device), the biometric information never leaves
the card/device. However, the aforementioned physical attacks
can be used to gleam the template from the card/device
or bypass critical security modules. Recently, homomorphic
encryption has been proposed for securing biometric templates
because it performs matching in the encrypted domain [23],
[24]. However, such approaches are still far from efficient,
requiring several orders of magnitude extra hardware and
operational time [25]. Further, they still may be susceptible
to attacks on the secret key kept on the user-side and fault
injection at the decision module.
In this paper, we propose a new paradigm called “Biometric
Locking by Obfuscation, Physically Unclonable Keys, and
Reconfigurability” (BLOcKeR) which aims to providie low-
cost template protection and attack resistance in match-on
card/device applications. A central element of BLOcKeR is
hardware personalization through reconfigurability. In short,
the cost associated with biometric systems is improved by
adapting the preprocessing, feature extraction, and postpro-
cessing modules on a user-to-user basis. In addition, we
combine two advances in hardware security obfuscation [26]
and physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [27], [28] with
configurability to significantly increase resistance to various
attacks against biometric systems. Our main contributions can
be summarized as follows:
1) BLOcKeR: We discuss the high-level features of
BLOcKeR, compare its features to traditional schemes,
and analyze its security against various attacks. Hard-
ware obfuscation removes the matcher and decision
modules, thus substantially reducing vulnerabilities. A
PUF, which is essentially a hardware biometric, is added
in order to avoid permanently storing the human biomet-
ric and/or cryptographic keys on the device. The PUF
also provides a non-invertible transform to the biometric
in order to protect the biometric template and make the
biometric/obfuscation non-linkable to different devices.
2) Noise-aware Feature Quantization: We propose NA-
IOMBA to select and quantize biometric features on
a user-to-user basis. In other words, only the most
robust features are selected for each user, thus avoid-
ing unnecessary post-processing costs. When available,
noise models are used to predict the impact of noise
and further reduce error correction costs and enrollment
time.
3) Case Studies: We perform three case studies to demon-
strate the effectiveness of NA-IOMBA. Experimental
results show that NA-IOMBA increases the length, en-
tropy, and robustness of keys generated from multiple
biometric modalities (fingerprint, iris, ECG, PPG). ECG
noise models for baseline wander, motion artifacts, EMG
noise, and stress/exercise are adopted to improve ECG
key reliability and reduce error correction costs. Imple-
mentation results from FPGA show that, even with less
resources (65% power and 62% utilization), reliability
is improved after integrating noise models into NA-
IOMBA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
hardware obfuscation, PUFs, the BLOcKeR flow, and its
merits in Section 2. In Section 3, the noise-aware quantization
framework is described. NA-IOMBA case studies including
comparison multiple biometric modalities, reduction in denois-
ing overhead, and reduction in enrollment times are discussed
in Section 4. In Section 5, conclusions are provided.
II. HARDWARE SECURITY PRELIMINARIES AND
BLOCKER
A. Hardware Obfuscation
Hardware obfuscation encapsulates a series of techniques
which lock a chip or system by blocking its normal function
at the hardware level until a correct key is applied. Without
a correct key, the device can be referred to as ‘locked or
‘obfuscated. In the typical instantiation, only the designer can
compute the key that unlocks the device. Obfuscation tech-
niques can be classified into three categories: logic encryption
(locking), logic permutation, and finite state machine (FSM)
locking.
The logic encryption approach operates by inserting addi-
tional components into the internal paths of combinational
logic in the original (un-obfuscated) design. These paths
indicate the gate-level interconnections as shown in Fig. 1(a).
The additional components, such as exclusive or (XOR) and
exclusive nor (XNOR) gates, modify the internal value of a
path based on the key. If the key is incorrect, the logic value
becomes inverted, thus creating an incorrect behavior in the
design. Typically, a large number n of additional components
(32, 64, 128, etc.) are inserted; thus, creating 2n possible
key combinations. Besides XOR/XNOR gates, modified look-
up table (LUTs), which can involve even more key bits
per additional component, can be utilized. Compared with
logic encryption, logic permutation alters the order of the
interconnections instead of changing their values. An example
of system-level obfuscation is presented in Fig. 1(b). The
key-controlled multiplexer (question mark box) conceals the
interconnections among integrated circuits (ICs). The finite-
state machine (FSM) based technique [29] embeds additional
states into the original FSM as shown in Fig. 1(c). In order
to unlock the design, a designated key input pattern navigates
the FSM from the obfuscated state space to the original state
space where the device is unlocked.
In BLOcKeR, we utilize the bitstream obfuscation scheme
which was first introduced in [31]. This key-based bitstream
obfuscation technique applies to reconfigurable fabrics and
can be used with off-the-shelf field programmable gate array
(FPGA) hardware. It leverages unused FPGA resources within
an existing design as shown in Fig. 2, thereby incurring very
little overhead. In this figure, the original design consists of
3Figure 1. (a) Logic encryption [34]; (b) logic permutatio, (c) FSM based on
obfuscation.
Figure 2. Robust bitstream protection in FPGA-based systems through low-
overhead obfuscation [31].
4 configurable logic blocks (CLBs) which can support three
input functions. However, only two input functions are used
by the original application, thus leaving half of the LUT
unoccupied. After obfuscation, these unused bits are filled
with other functions; the correct response selection depends
on the key input position and value. The obfuscated bitstream
can take one of two formats: (a) structural Verilog, which
implements the circuit as a series of assignment statements, or
(b) using device-specific LUT primitive functions. Compared
to the previously described obfuscation approaches, we choose
bitstream obfuscation because it allows the obfuscation key to
change for every chip/user due to the reconfigurable hardware.
This is an important feature since a biometric-derived key will
be different from user to user. Other obfuscation approaches
are fixed by a master key and cannot be adapted in this manner.
B. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
The best way to describe a PUF is that it is “an object’s
fingerprint”. Like a biometric which expresses a human’s
identity, a PUF is an expression of an inherent and un-
clonable instance-specific feature of a physical object [32].
For integrated circuits (ICs), these instance-specific features
are induced by manufacturing process variations and can
be captured by the input/output or challenge/response pairs
(CRPs) of the PUF. The challenge/response relationship can
be viewed as a physical one-way function which provides the
design with a non-invertible capability. In addition, due to IC-
to-IC process variations, the CRPs are unique to each device.
We refer to this property as non-linkability.
A variety of PUFs have been proposed in the literature
[32]. They can be broadly classified into electronic and non-
electronic categories. In the former, the challenge-response
mechanism is determined based on the electronic properties of
an object such as delay of internal circuit paths, the threshold
voltages of transistors, etc. Examples of this PUF type include
arbiter PUF, ring oscillator PUF, SRAM PUF, etc. The non-
electronic PUF generates the CRPs based on the non-electronic
properties of an object, such as magnetic, acoustic, radio
frequency, etc.
According to the number of total CRPs available, PUFs can
be classified as strong and weak. A PUF is called strong
if, even after giving an adversary access to a PUF instance
for a prolonged period, it is still possible to come up with
an unknown CRP with high probability. This implies that
the considered PUF should have an exponentially sized CRP
set. Otherwise, the adversary can simply query all challenges.
PUFs which do not meet these requirements are consequen-
tially called weak PUFs. In BLOcKeR, a strong PUF is
utilized.
A recently developed attack against the strong PUF applies
well-developed machine learning algorithms (such as logistic
regression) to model challenge-response behaviors [35] based
on a subset of CRPs. This CRP set is collected from the strong
PUF via the direct physical access. With this model, a new
CRP can be predicted without having physical access to the
device. A high prediction rate (i.e., 99.9%) can be achieved
with short training time (i.e., 2.1 seconds) [35]. Note that,
in BLOcKeR, this modeling attack is seen as a benefit. More
details will be given in Section II-C.
C. BLOcKeR Flow
In this section, the BLOcKeR enrollment and authentication
processes are discussed (see Fig. 3). The enrollment process
involves three major steps: hardware enrollment, ownership
claim, and firmware customization.
The first step to initialize BLOcKeR, hardware enrollment,
is accomplished before the device is sent to the market and
occurs in a trusted environment. During this step, the designer
or system vendor builds a strong PUF model for each device
using a dedicated firmware and stores the models in a secure
database. This firmware enables the designer to efficiently
collect a sufficient number of CRPs for the prediction model.
After enrolling the PUF model, this firmware will be removed.
At this point, the device encloses no firmware and will be sold
to the user through the insecure supply chain. Since neither the
user nor attacker could have the high-speed and direct access
to the PUF challenges after this point, the prediction model is
therefore accessible only to the designer.
To register and operate the device, the ownership claim step
is taken by the legitimate user∗. The users ownership is taken
by presenting his/her biometric signal to the device. A pre-
processing algorithm is applied on the received biometric to
extract the binary bio key. Along with this process, necessary
helper data (i.e., error correction code or ECC [3]) might
be generated for correcting errors during later authentication
steps. A PUF is used as a one-way transform on the quantized
biometric. In order to generate the PUF challenge, the bio key
is processed by a hardware hash function to the desired length.
∗Note that this step only occurs once
4The output is transmitted to the designer through a secure
channel. This can be achieved by either a trusted retailer
(e.g., Verizon) or a trusted platform module (TPM) enabled
device (e.g., laptops). Note that in BLOcKeR, the biometric
template is never stored on the device and never sent to the
designer/vendor.
When the PUF challenge is received by the designer,
the firmware customization step occurs. This is where the
previous strong PUF model is beneficial. The challenge is fed
into the strong PUF model to compute a unique device and
biometric dependent response, which will behave as an obfus-
cation key (obs key). An obfuscated bitstream is produced that
will exploit this obfuscation key. The obfuscated bitstream is
sent to the user and loaded into the device. Note that since the
physical device with the PUF is no longer accessible to the
designer/vendor, this step would not be possible without the
previously generated strong PUF model.
During the authentication process, the user provides his/her
biometric as input. The same pre-processing algorithm as the
enrollment process is applied to generate the bio key. Potential
errors are corrected with the helper data. Next, the hash
function creates the challenge. The obs key is then generated
by injecting this challenge into the strong PUF. Different from
the enrollment process, this obfuscation key is generated on
the physical device instead of its mathematic model. A correct
obs key unlocks the obfuscated bitstream and brings the device
into functional (unlocked) mode. Without the correct key, the
device will simply not work correctly. For example, it will
be unable to access data, perform critical protocols, etc. Note
that the biometric template, bio key, and obs key are never
stored in non-volatile (permanent) memory on the card/device
or server.
Its important to note that since the obfuscation key is
generated from the PUF circuit, it may be subjected to various
environmental noise such as temperature instability, supply
voltage fluctuation, etc. For instance, the arbiter PUF exploits
a race condition between two paths of the same length. Process
variations of the transistors on these paths determine the
competition result. However, an increased temperature could
cause a faster path to become slower. In some instances, the
temperature effect overrides the process variation and gener-
ates errors. Thus, the PUF response may vary slightly even
for the same challenge due to noise. To address these errors,
an additional ECC module can be implemented for the PUF.
Alternatively, the obfuscated bitstream can be constructed to
tolerate these errors. The latter is a promising topic for future
work.
D. Salient Features of BLOcKeR
The following are noteworthy features of the BLOcKeR
framework:
• By incorporating a PUF, the scheme possesses a non-
invertible property that makes it similar to feature trans-
formation approaches in the literature [18]. This implies
that an attacker cannot reconstruct the biometric template
even if the obfuscation key is ever stolen from the server
or working card/device.
• Another major advantage of the PUF is its non-linkable
property, which means that a user’s biometric can be
only used to unlock one device. In other words, the
obfuscated bitstream produced for every device is unique
to both the device and the legitimate user. Therefore, even
a legitimately enrolled user of one device cannot unlock
the device which it is not bonded with.
• The enrollment/authentication processes inherently pro-
vide information security. All private information is
kept secret and never stored in a non-volatile (permanent)
memory. Only the strong PUF challenge is transmitted
to the server and the biometric template is protected
by non-invertibility of the hash function and PUF. The
obfuscation key is generated when the user authenticates
and is also never permanently stored. These features
dramatically reduce the attack surface at the chip/device,
server, and communication channel (more details in next
section).
• Reconfigurability is advantageous because it allows
each devices obfuscation/locking to be tuned to its
owner. In addition, it allows the hardware to adapt pre-
processing, feature extraction, post-processing, and error
correction overheads on a user-to-user basis. This latter
benefit will be made clearer in the remaining sections of
the paper.
E. Attacks Analysis
As discussed earlier, current biometric technologies can
be classified into match-on card/device and match-on server.
Considering the cost and accessibility of the device under
attack, the attacks can be labeled as follows. Non-invasive
attacks [38], [39] require the lowest cost and no physical tam-
pering. Semi-invasive attacks [36], [37] require intermediate
cost and minimal physical tampering (e.g., backside thinning).
Invasive attacks [33] require the highest cost and full physical
tampering.
In Table I, the attacks are organized by their cost and
applicability. The red italic text indicates the attacker’s ob-
jective template theft/recovery, denial of service, or unautho-
rized card/device access. The invasive attacks such as micro-
probing [33] can be utilized to compromise the non-volatile
memory, such as Flash or Anti-fuse, on the card/device.
Semi-invasive attacks, such as the fault injection and memory
bumping attack [37], can be applied to create false accepts by
the matcher and decision module or to determine the template
respectively. Other semi-invasive attacks, such as modifying
templates, may cause the denial of service or unauthorized
access. Since both invasive and semi-invasive attacks require
at least minimal physical access, these attacks can be only
applied on the match-on card/device frameworks. In con-
trast, non-invasive attacks apply to both types of frameworks.
Software-level attacks [38], such as software Trojan, can be
utilized to leak biometric templates. The hill-climbing attack
is performed by iteratively submitting synthetic representa-
tions of the user’s biometric until a successful recognition is
achieved [47]. At each step, the employed data are modified
according to the matching score of previous attempts. If the
5cryptography techniques are engaged to protect the template,
then side-channel attacks may be employed. Side channel
attacks rely on the information gained from data and control
flow dependent emanations from the cryptosystem’s physical
implementation [46], such as power, timing, electromagnetic,
acoustic, etc. Finally, the communication channel from/to the
server is also vulnerable when the protocol is not properly
implemented.
The unique structure of BLOcKeR protects it from all the
above attacks. Since the template is never stored anywhere,
the template privacy issues are eliminated. In BLOcKeR,
no matcher or decision module is implemented. Instead of
comparing the key with a template, an obfuscation key resolves
a device-unique obfuscation. Thus, no semi-invasive attacks,
which target these components, are applicable. Since the
Figure 3. Overall implementation flow of BLOcKeR.
bitstream obfuscation is engaged in BLOcKeR, obfuscation-
oriented attacks must also be accounted for since they may
introduce new vulnerabilities. The most straightforward at-
tack is brute-force. An adversary either randomly applies: (i)
synthesized biometric signals (at arrow 0 in Fig. 3) or (ii)
the obfuscation key (at arrow 4 in Fig. 3) until the correct
system functionality is observed. This attack is infeasible in
both cases due to the extremely large analog input and binary
obfuscation key spaces. Furthermore, brute force cannot be
improved through hill climbing since (i) there is no matching
module to provide a score and (ii) a non-invertible transform
is applied to the input. Specifically, the data flow back from
arrow 4 to 3 (Fig. 3) is blocked by the strong PUF. The data
flow back from arrow 3 to 2 (Fig. 3) is blocked by the one-way
hash function.
Besides brute force, a more advanced attack on obfuscation
is based on satisfiability checking (SAT) [45]. The SAT attack
infers the correct key using a small number of carefully
selected input patterns and their correct outputs observed from
an activated functional device. Since the obfuscation key is
destroyed after losing power (i.e., it’s not stored in non-volatile
memory), it is unlikely for an adversary to capture an activated
device. Even if the adversary is a legitimate user and has
access to an activated device, the strong PUF module is still a
black box. Thus, it is impractical for the adversary to generate
a desired obfuscation key for another device using synthetic
biometric signals.
III. NOISE-AWARE QUANTIZATION FRAMEWORK
A. IOMBA based Biometric Key Generation
Biometric systems that operate using any single biometric
characteristic have the several limitations such as noise in
Table I
POSSIBLE ATTACKS AND VULNERABILITIES OF CURRENT EMPLOYED
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION STRATEGIES.
Match-on server Match-on card
Invasive
attacks
–
Micro-probing,
Template privacy
Semi-invasive
attacks
–
Fault injection;
Memory bumping
Unauthorized access
Modify template/parameter
Denial of Service
& Unauthorized access
Non-invasive
attacks
Buffer overflow;
Software Trojan;
Malware;
Hill climbing;
Comm. protocol
Template privacy
Buffer overflow;
Software Trojan;
Malware;
Hill climbing;
Side-channel attack
Template privacy
sensed data, intra-class variations (the biometric data acquired
from an individual during authentication may be very different
from the data that was used to generate the template during
enrollment), and distinctiveness (biometric trait is expected
to vary significantly across individuals). Noise in biometric
authentication and recognition applications can be tolerated to
some extent; however, not a single error can be tolerated in key
generation applications like BLOcKeR. To address this limi-
tation, we have previously developed the interval optimized
mapping bit allocation (IOMBA) scheme for biometric key
generation [3].
In short, IOMBA tunes the biometric key generation process
to each user rather than relying on a generic approach for all
users. The performance is controlled by two parameters, α and
β, which define the entropy and reliability of generated keys
respectively. IOMBA eliminates features from the space that
have low entropy and quantizes features with larger entropy
and lesser noise into more bits. Then, since noise will impact
each users biometric differently, the features that are more
sensitive to noise (i.e., unreliable for key generation) are also
removed on a user-to-user basis. As a result, the length of keys
generated varies based on the α and β parameters as well as
from user to user.
The major steps of the IOMBA are described as follows.
1) Data Pre-Processing: The signals from the population
are pre-processed to remove noise followed by feature ex-
traction. The feature elements from the same location are
extracted from the population and normalized into a standard
normal distribution. The same normalization parameters are
later exploited to normalize the corresponding feature elements
of each subject. Our approach can work with any biometric
provided it produces statistically independent and Gaussian
features in some representation. Note that any feature that does
not meet these requirements is discarded.
2) IOMBA Margin Calculation from Population Statis-
tics: IOMBA quantizes each feature into a different number of
bits. 2 bit quantization is illustrated in Fig. 4. The population
PDF of a feature is shown in blue. As an exampleexample, to
illustrate the reliability calculation, three subjects distributions
are considered. According to these distributions as well as
6the α (entropy) and β (reliability) parameters, the boundaries
(µle f t,01, µright,01, µ00) and threshold (0, T ) which satisfy the
following equations are computed∫ µ00
∞ PDFpop(x)dx∫ µright,01
µle f t,01 PDFpop(x)dx
≤ α
∫ ∞
T
PDFsub1(x)dx≤ β (1)
∫ T
−∞
PDFsub2(x)dx≤ β
∫ ∞
0
PDFsub3(x)dx≤ β (2)
PDFpop(x) denotes the distribution for feature x for the entire
population and PDFsuby(x) denotes the distribution (due to
noise) for feature x of subject y. Fig. 4 illustrates these values
on the negative side of the x axis. The positive boundaries
and thresholds can be simply computed by mirroring the
negative values onto the positive side against the y axis.
These boundaries and thresholds guarantee that enrolled and
regenerated key bits are statistically random and reliable.
Figure 4. Schematic for optimization of quantization with two bits.
3) Enrollment for Key and Helper Data Generation:
Essentially, IOMBA personalizes a biometric system to each
user. For each subject, the key generation framework utilizes
the above boundaries to determine whether each feature ele-
ment is good for generating key bits or not. The least reliable
features of the user which do not fulfill the above constraints
are discarded. The helper data for each subject consist of the
following: (i) the index of the reliable features selected for
the user, (ii) the number of bits each feature can be quantized
into, and (iii) the normalization parameters for each feature.
If error still exists then error correction based helper data and
an error correction module can also be added.
4) Key Regeneration: The user presents his/her biometric,
features are extracted, and the helper data stored on the system
is used to eliminate the unreliable features and then quantize
the reliable features to regenerate the key.
In IOMBA, feature extraction, helper data, and key regener-
ation steps are different for each user. Reconfigurable hardware
is therefore a natural candidate for implementing IOMBA
because each step can be tailored uniquely to the user, thereby
avoiding certain processing costs.
B. Noise Aware IOMBA (NA-IOMBA)
In the original IOMBA, standard deviation in user PDFs
was fixed for each feature in a worst case manner. Feature
selection was therefore pessimistic and resulted in shorter
keys. Estimating the standard deviation, especially for con-
tinuous biometrics (keystroke dynamics, ECG, etc.), is non-
trivial since the biometric would need to be collected at all
conditions and types of noise. In most applications, such
as IoT, the enrollment process would be too long for users
to tolerate. In addition, the impact of noise is substantially
effected by the type and amount of pre-processing. In resource
constrained scenarios, it would be better to eliminate pre-
processing steps which are costly and energy consuming to
perform. To accommodate these issues, we propose the noise-
aware IOMBA framework in this section and demonstrate its
benefits in Section 4. NA-IOMBA is a variant of IOMBA that
incorporates models to predict the impact of different noise
sources, noise scale, and pre-processing steps on biometric key
generation. In short, all IOMBA steps are performed with one
major change. Margins and boundaries are recomputed based
on more accurate estimates of user feature standard deviation.
Features that are modeled as less (more) susceptible to noise
will therefore be given smaller (larger) margins than IOMBA.
The following are the impacts and benefits of this approach:
• Impact on key length: If a margin for a feature increases,
it could result in the feature being selected and/or longer
bit lengths compared to IOMBA. If a margin for a feature
shrinks, it could result in the feature no longer being
selected and/or shorter bit lengths compared to IOMBA.
• Impact on key reliability: If provided noise samples or
models are accurate, the reliability of key should improve
regardless of whether or not the key length shrinks/grows.
• Impact on cost and enrollment time: There are three
ways that overheads can be reduced. First, error correc-
tion costs tend to increase nonlinearly. By improving key
reliability, error correction hardware can be substantially
reduced. Second, certain denoising/filtering steps can be
removed provided that NA-IOMBA models accurately
estimate the noise appearing in features without them.
Third, number of enrollment samples and enrollment time
can be reduced if noise over time and different conditions
can be modeled. This can be particularly important for
continuous physiological signals, like ECG and PPG,
which can be impacted by so many different conditions,
e.g., exercise, stress, and food/drink/drug consumption.
IV. NA-IOMBA CASE STUDIES
The above impacts will be demonstrated in the next section.
A. Case Study I: Comparison of Multiple Modalities Using
IOMBA and NA-IOMBA
In this section, we present a comprehensive performance
evaluation of biometric-based key generation. We apply
our approaches (IOMBA & NA-IOMBA) on four biometric
modalities: ECG, PPG, iris, and fingerprint. Table II shows
the methodologies, databases, and train/test sizes, that have
been employed for multiple biometric modalities.
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HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY ANALYSIS FOR MULTIPLE BIOMETRIC MODALITIES
Databases Population size Train / Test sizes Pre-processing Feature Extraction
ECG PTB 52 52*1000/1560*1000 FIR filter, R peak det., Segmentation NCN
PPG Capnobase 42 42*700/ 840*700 Butterworth, Peak det., Segmentation DWT
Iris CASIAV1 108 108*4800/756*4800 Localization Gabor wavelet
Finger FVC2004-DB3 100 100*6056/800*6056 Normalization, Orientation Gabor wavelet
Table III
IOMBA/NA-IOMBA RESULTS FOR FOUR BIOMETRIC MODALITIES
Key Length (N) Reliability Min-entropy
Max Ave Min Max Ave Min Max Ave Min
ECG NA-IOMBA 1247 953 784 100 98.76 96.17 1.000 0.9843 0.9055IOMBA 976 668 512 100 97.93 94.71 1.000 0.9819 0.8904
PPG NA-IOMBA 195 107 17 100 99.04 91.11 0.9943 0.8630 0.6229IOMBA 175 114 14 100 96.63 89.00 0.9787 0.8047 0.5732
Iris NA-IOMBA 1136 556 128 100 98.36 93.42 1.000 0.9376 0.7870IOMBA 204 66 23 100 96.81 86.73 1.000 0.869 0.7564
Finger NA-IOMBA 3567 1004 321 99.54 98.76 91.72 1.000 0.8219 0.4913IOMBA 1164 835 187 99.20 95.12 72.29 0.9939 0.7574 0.3258
Electrocardiogram (ECG): ECG is a recording of the electric
potential, generated by the electric activity of the heart. The
ECG recordings of 52 subjects from the PTB database [14] are
used in this paper. We employ low and high pass finite impulse
response (FIR) filters with cut off frequencies 1Hz-40Hz to
eliminate noise associated with an ECG signal. Normalize-
Convoluted Normalize (NCN) is used as the feature extraction
technique [2].
Photoplethysmogram (PPG): The photoplethysmogram
(PPG) is a biomedical signal that estimates volumetric blood
flow changes in peripheral circulation using low-cost and
simple LED-based devices typically placed on the fingertips.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the PPG biometric
authentication based on IOMBA and NA-IOMBA, a publicly
available Capnobase dataset [12] with 42 subjects was used.
We adopt the pre-processing, feature extraction from [43].
Iris: The iris is the annular region of the eye bounded by
the pupil and the sclera (white of the eye) on either side.
To evaluate the iris key generation based on IOMBA and NA-
IOMBA, we first take the iris images from available CASIAv1-
Interval iris database [13]. [44] approche is used for pre-
processing stage, and fearure extraction.
Fingerprint: A fingerprint is the pattern of ridges and valleys
on the surface of a fingertip, the formation of which is
determined during the first seven months of fetal develop-
ment. The fingerprint used for biometric key generation for
system authentication in the study is taken from FVC2004
database [10]. In this paper, Gabor filter is used to directly
extract fingerprint features from gray level images [9].
The quality of generated keys are compared by four eval-
uation criteria: reliability, entropy, key length, and cost. The
metrics used for each are discussed below and a brief com-
parison of the above biometric modalities based on IOMBA
and NA-IOMBA is provided in Tables III under reliability,
entropy, and key length. In the table, ‘max’, ‘ave’, and ‘min’
columns correspond to the highest value (best case) achieved
among all users, the average of keys across the users, and the
lowest value (worst case) achieved among all users. Note that
for this initial comparison, the noise model in NA-IOMBA is
adopted from standard deviation of enrollment measurements
and standard deviation is adjusted on a per feature basis. A
more elaborate model will be used for ECGs only later in the
paper.
Reliability: Reliability of key generation represents the stabil-
ity of keys over time. If all bits generated by the biometric of
an individual are equal to the key produced in enrollment,
it can be considered as reliable. We adopt the Reliability
metrics from [3]. As can be seen in Table III, improvements in
reliability are achieved by applying the NA-IOMBA technique.
Average and worst cases improve by 2% and 9.7% on average
for all modalities compared to IOMBA. Among all modalities,
fingerprint attains the largest percentage improvements (3.8%
and 26.9% in average and worst cases). However, ECG has
the best performance for both NA-IOMBA and IOMBA.
Entropy: To measure key randomness, we calculate the min-
entropy.We adopt the Min-entopy metrics from [3]. As shown
in Tables III, the min-entropy of ECG signal is higher than iris,
PPG and fingerprint However, under NA-IOMBA technique,
there is a huge entropy improvement for iris, fingerprint and
PPG compare to IOMBA results. For example, the min-
entropy is not only improved by 35% at minimum case for
fingerprint based on NA-IOMBA, but also increased by 8% at
average case.
Key length: Since certain features may be reliable for some
users and unreliable for others, our approach will only use
reliable features from each individual. Thus, the key length per
person may change. As can be indicated in Table III, the key
length of ECG, PPG, iris, and fingerprint based on IOMBA
are 668, 114, 66, and 835, respectively. When NA-IOMBA
is applied, the average key length for ECG, PPG, iris, and
fingerprint increases by 30%, 6%, 88%, and 27%. Fingerprint
obtains the largest key for both IOMBA and NA-IOMBA while
PPG obtains the smallest.
Cost: The effectiveness of a biometric technology is dependent
on how and where it is used. Each biometric modality has
its own strengths and weaknesses. Today, an ECG or a PPG
8sensor costs around $20 when ordered in large quantities,
thus has marginal cost of embedding into a biometric system.
However, fingerprint and iris scan costs about $70 and $280,
respectively. Note that the hardware cost is normalized into 1
in order to make it simpler to consider as a metrics. In that
case, if the value is lower than 1; meaning a more expensive
sensor.
Figure 5 (a) ranks four common technologies (ECG, PPG,
iris scan, finger scan) according to four criteria: reliability,
entropy, key length, and hardware cost. The maximum point
in each length indicates the best candidate for that specific
criteria. As can be seen in Figure 5, the average reliability of
ECG is 99.76% belong to the maximum point of plot while
the average reliability of iris is 98.36% which belongs to the
minimum point of plot. In addition, the entropy of ECG is on
the maximum point of plot. For the cost, PPG is the best choice
among all biometric modalities. Furthermore, the key length
of fingerprint is higher than other biometric modalities which
made it to become at top of the plot, although the ECG signal
is following this with a small margin. ECG appears to be the
best candidate for all the criteria when applying NA-IOMBA.
However, it is worth noting that ECG still suffers from several
other issues (impact of noises, stress condition, and aging) that
need to be tackled in order to make this candidate an even
stronger selection. NA-IOMBA will be used to alleviate these
concerns in the next subsections.
(a) (b)
Figure 5. (a) Star graph for comprehensive comparison among four biometrics
using NA-IOMBA. (b) One beat ECG with fiducial point.
B. Case Study 2: Denoising Overhead Reduction
In order to determine the sensitivity of ECG key generation
based on these feature extraction, the noisy ECG signal with
different variances (SNR) has been applied. To view the impact
of each noise source, synthetic ECGs are generated and not
pre-processed to remove the noise.
1) ECG synthetic model: We also adopt the non-linear
dynamical model proposed by McSharry et al. [41] to extract
dynamic parameters from a real ECG database and generate
synthetic ECGs. The aim of this approach is to provide
a standard realistic ECG signal with known characteristics
from ECG (Fig. 5 (b)), which can be generated with specific
statistics thereby facilitating the performance evaluation of a
given technique.
2) ECG Noise Modeling: The three main types of noise
sources in raw ECG signals are (1) muscle artifacts (MA)
which occur due to electrical activity of muscles; (2) baseline
wander (BW) caused by body movement; and (3) electrode
movement (EM) due to poor contact to the sensor. We adopt
the noise model from [2].
Fig. 6 (a) presents the experimental protocol of NA-IOMBA
scheme for noisy ECG signals. In noisy ECG key margin
reconstruction, dynamic model parameters (θi,αi,bi) from
original ECG signal are considered as the input of the synthetic
ECG module. Then, synthetic ECG noise model with desired
SNR is employed to add into the clean (synthetic) ECG.
In order to assess a noise model in NA-IOMBA, we assume
Ne and Nv are the noise in the enrollment and verification mea-
surement, respectively. The synthetic noise model is employed
as verification noise. It is assumed that Ne and Nv are mutually
independent where the standard deviation of measurement
noise are denoted as σe and σv respectively. We will adopt
synthetic ECG noise as our noise model where we assume that
σv > σe. Thus, re-optimization of IOMBA margins module
in NA-IOMBA determines new margins based on feedback
from this assessment. For our approach, we consider the mixed
noises with SNR=5dB for ECG margin reconstruction.
Figure 7 is a box plot showing the reliability rate versus
input signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for ECG based on IOMBA
without denoising filters, IOMBA with denoising filters, and
NA-IOMBA. The SNR during the noisy segments was set to
30dB, 20dB, 10dB, 5dB, 0dB, and -5dB separately. Figures 7
(a-d) indicate the impact of each noise source (BW, EM, and
MA, and mixed of them) on the reliability. In the context of
ECG noise levels, the lower SNR provides more fluctuation on
ECGs (higher intra-class variation). Intuitively, there appears
to be an inverse relationship between the level of generated
noise and reliability. Among all these noise sources, MA and
EM are the strongest noise sources and have enormous impact
on key reliability when IOMBA is applied with and without
filtering. As one would expect, IOMBA with filtering obtains
better key reliability than without. However, for NA-IOMBA,
the reliability is never less than 96.7% even at worst case
(mixed noise with -5dB). In contrast, there is considerable
degradation beyond 20dB by using IOMBA with/without
filtering (63% reliability). As mentioned earlier, ECC increases
nonlinearly with number of errors. NA-IOMBA has a very
high reliability compared to IOMBA, and therefore ECC
will inherently consume less overhead. The cost reduction is
discussed further below.
3) FPGA Implementation of an IOMBA: In this paper, finite
impulse response (FIR) is designed using Simulink in Xilinx
System Generator. The Xilinx System Generator tool is a high-
level tool for designing high-performance DSP systems and
enables us to integrate Xilinx with Simulink. To implement
noise reduction using FIR filter, a FDA tool has been applied
to design a filter for required specifications. Pan Tompkins
algorithm is applied for detecting ECG R peak and segmenta-
tion. Finally, the NCN feature extraction technique has been
considered for key generation. Table IV shows implementation
of the ECG key generation using IOMBA with filtering and
NA-IOMBA without filtering on the Xilinx Zynq-7000. In
IOMBA case, 11% of total flip-flops (FF), 20% of all available
Look-up tables (LUTs), and 71% of the DSP slice are used
while in NA-IOMBA consumes only 1% of FFs, 4% of LUTs,
and 10% of DSP are utilized. In addition, IOMBA consumes
9(a) (b)
Figure 6. Block diagrams show for NA-IOMBA margin reconstruction key calculation from; (a) noisy ECG , (b) stressed ECG.
Table IV
HARDWARE UTILIZATION REPORT ON THE ZYNQ-7000 SOC XC7Z020.
Resource IOMBA Usage NA-IOMBA Usage Available
Flip Flops 11830 1064 106400
Look-Up Tables 10386 2232 53200
DSP Slices 157 21 220
I/O 32 20 200
(c) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7. IOMBA, filtered IOMBA, and NA-IOMBA Keys reliability rate vs
input SNR; impact of (a) BW noise, (b) EM noise, (c) MA noise, and (d)
mixed noises, on the reliability.
113 mW power while NA-IOMBA consumes only 39 mW
power. As a result, by saving overall overhead while applying
NA-IOMBA, we are able to add ECC in the IoT devices to
reconstruct the errors. In fact, NA-IOMBA allows hardware to
adapt pre-processing, feature extraction, post-processing, and
error correction overheads on a user-to-user basis.
C. Case Study 3: Reducing Enrollment Times
Another concern that restricts the use of ECG for biometric
authentication is the variability of cardiac rhythm within
the subjects. Heart rate varies with individuals physiological
and mental conditions. Stress, excitement, exercise, and other
working activities may have impact on the heart rate and can
elevate it. These variations are likely to affect the reliability
of ECG based key generation. A previous study [48] about
the influences of physical exercises indicates that the ECG
morphology is affected by exercise/stress. In other words,
each peak (P, QRS, T) in the ECG may increase/decrease
in amplitude, temporal location, etc. To cover the impact of
stress/exercise on the reliability with different scenario, we
vary the dynamical model parameters by type (θi,αi,bi∀i)
and analyze the impact of each part of ECG waveform.
In Fig. 6 (b), we illustrate how noise in ECG features
from stress/exercise can be handled using the model in NA-
IOMBA. In order to assess the impact of stress in NA-IOMBA,
NA-IOMBA trains itself with the help of the information
from standard deviation of stress ECG signal model and re-
optimizes IOMBA margins.
Each dynamical model parameter is scaled by a factor
(0.9− 0.5). Fig. 8(a-c) show how the ECG changes when
scaling α, b, and θ parameters respectively. As shown in Fig. 8
(a), the α parameter controls amplitudes of each component
of ECG waveform. In contrast, the onset and offset of ECG
waveform and interval duration are associated with scaling
b and θ parameters. We intend to investigate the impact of
dynamic parameters on each ECG waveform component to
analyze the impact of stress & exercise on the reliability of
IOMBA/NA-IOMBA.
Fig. 9((a-c) indicate the reliability of each dynamic param-
eters on the P, QRS, and T waves based on IOMBA, respec-
tively. The reliability of NA-IOMBA is shown in Fig. 9(d-f)
where IOMBA margins are re-optimized assuming dynamic
parameters scaled to 0.7. For IOMBA, the T wave is impacted
by all parameters (α, b, and θ). At lowest scale value (0.5),
the minimum reliability of dynamic parameters of T wave is
71.61% while for P and QRS wave are 72.37%, and 73.96%
respectively. θ has a larger impact than other parameters for
P and QRS waves because it causes distortion in ECG time
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8. Impact of ECG signal by decreasing dynamical model parameters: (a) α parameters associated with amplitude, (b) b parameters, and (c) θ parameters
associated with interval and heart rate.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 9. Impact of stress/exercise on the reliability of; IOMBA for changing (a) P wave, (b) QRS wave, (c) T wave; NA-IOMBA for changing, (d) P wave,
(e) QRS wave, and (f) T wave of ECG.
intervals (distances between peaks). Even though there is too
much degradation on the reliability for IOMBA technique,
the performance of NA-IOMBA in stress/exercise situation
is much higher than IOMBA. The minimum reliability of
dynamic parameter on P, QRS, and T waves (Fig. 9(d))
are improved by 25%. Note, however, that the key length
is sacrificed by 56% (420 average key bits) to obtain this
improvement. We expect that this will be long enough for
most cryptographic applications as well as BLOcKeR.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced the first ever biometric system
implementation that utilizes reconfigurability, bitstream obfus-
cation, strong PUFs, and PUF challenge-response predication
models. The non-invertibility, non-linkability, and information
security of keys used by the proposed approach made it re-
sistant to many common attacks against match-on card/device
biometric systems. In addition, the interval optimized map-
ping bit allocation (IOMBA) scheme for key generation was
improved by incorporating noise models. It was demonstrated
that keys generated from ECG, PPG, iris, and fingerprint by
noise-aware IOMBA were more reliable, longer, and higher
entropy than noise-free IOMBA. In addition, by using more
advanced noise models for ECG, overhead from denoising
filters and error correction could be further reduced by 62%
without additional enrollment measurements. In future, we will
develop noise-tolerant bitstream obfuscation approaches and
analyze them with respect to overhead and vulnerability to
attacks.
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